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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST|ATE OF UTAH
GAYLA HATCH ANDERSON,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

]
!
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.

]

MICHAEL HALL HATCH
Defendant/Appellant.

I>

Case No. 860225

]

REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the outset of this Reply Brief defendant/appellant
deems it necessary to reply to certain assertions made in the
plaintiff/respondent's Statement of Facts. At page 2 thereof the
plaintiff asserts, "Mrs. Hatch's attorney drafted a Stipulation
which reflected the parties agreement. (R.58).
Exhibit 'A' in the Addendum to this Brief."

It is included as

The Exhibit A shown

in the Addendum has no signatures on it, was never filed in the
action nor incorporated in the Findings, Conclusions or Decree,
and is nothing more than an initial draft jwhich was prepared by
plaintiff's counsel and which was rejected by the defendant.
Plaintiff's statement that that stipulation reflects the parties'
"agreement" is totally unjustified.
Further, it should be noted that plaintiff's reference
to page 58 of the record only refers to plaintiff's Affidavit.

and that Affidavit doesn't even claim that the said unsigned
Stipulation is the agreement of the parties.

It only asserts

that the unsigned Stipulation sets forth plaintiff's "intent."
It is true that plaintiff (in her Verified Motion to
Compel, R.57-65) asserts that the unsigned Stipulation sets forth
what she desired, and she even states in paragraph 5 thereof
(R.58):
"The plaintiff, on the instructions of plaintiff's
counsel, Nolan J. Olsen, signed a stipulation which was
eventually filed and entered with this court, and the
plaintiff was never notified that said stipulation
contained language which varied from her above-described
intent and understanding as to the disposition of the
parties' marital residence."
Any claim that the unsigned Stipulation sets forth the
agreement of the parties is controverted by the fact that it
wasn't even used and by the affidavit of the defendant (R.70-71)
and of defendant's counsel, Leland K. Wimn^r (R.72-73).

If the

plaintiff is stating that her attorney, Nolan J. Olsen, did not
carry out her instructions, then that is a matter between her and
her attorney, but does not affect the validity of the actual
Stipulation signed and filed in this action by Mr. Olsen and
plaintiff, and in any event such a claim would seem to be rebutted
by the fact that she signed the Stipulation along with her
attorney and thereby approved the settlement as set forth in the
signed Stipulation.

Plaintiff does not claim that there was any

fraud or trickery on the part of defendant or his attorney, and of
course there was none.
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We believe that the assertion of plaintiff that the
signed Stipulation didn't set forth her "intent" lacks persuasion
for several other reasons. First of all, the plaintiff as noted
signed the document, and we can assume that she read it and had it
explained to her by her counsel. Mr. Nolan Olsen is a reputable
attorney of many years experience, and no doubt represented his
clients1 interests fully and properly.

Nowhere does plaintiff

assert that she did not read the document or that she did not
understand it, although she states in paragraph 4 that she "never
waivered from her instructions to her previous counsel." The
uncontroverted fact is that she signed a document at variance with
those supposed instructions and thereby clearly "waivered" from
any such earlier instructions to her counsel. Furthermore, we
feel it is significant that there is no affidavit of Nolan J.
Olsen on file in this matter, which one would suppose plaintiff
would have obtained if there had been any error in the Stipulation
as signed.

One can only suppose that Nolan J. Olsen fully

intended to enter into the actual Stipulation which was filed in
this action, and that he did so with the assent of his client, who
approved the Stipulation by placing her signature thereon.

There

would seem to be no question that Mr. Olsen intended to enter into
the very Stipulation which was entered into and under clear
authority plaintiff is bound by the actions taken by her counsel
(and herself) who, it should be noted, actually drafted the
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Findings, Conclusions and Decree which incorporated the
Stipulation.

It is inconceivable that Mr. Olsen could incorporate

the Stipuation in the Findings, Conclusions and Decree and not
know what it said and be confident that it incorporated his
client's agreement.
It should further be noted that at page 3 of the
Statement of Facts of the plaintiff, in the final paragraph
thereof, plaintiff refers to "Mrs. Hatch's retyped stipulation."
We are unaware of any such document.

Such a document does not

appear in the record, nor is any such document attached to the
Addendum in any Brief filed herein.

It is an instrument unknown

to the defendant and is apparently a non-existent document.
Further, we desire to note that there are indeed a
number of differences between the unsigned Stipulation and the
Stipulation which was actually signed by the parties and filed in
this action.

It is interesting to note that the additional

changes are substantial, were obviously negotiated by the parties,
and no objection to any of the same is now raised by plaintiff,
and plaintiff thereby acknowledges that considerable negotiations
took place subsequent to the drafting of the unsigned Stipulation
and prior to the execution of the Stipulation which was actually
signed by the parties and accepted by the court. They are
reflected in the following changes:
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Unsigned Stipulation
(R.66,67)

Stipulation signed
and filed (R.15-17)

$150 per child support money

$100 per child support money

Defendant maintain medical
insurance and life insurance

Defendant pay $350 additional
attorney's fees

Defendant maintain health
and life insurance only so
long as available to him
at his employment
Each; party assume own
attorney's fees and costs

No reference to marriage

Plaintiff agrees to continue

counseling

existing marriage counseling
It should further be noted that the plaintiff claims in

her Verified Motion (R.57-65) that the provisions of the unsigned
Stipulation were to have been incorporated in the signed
Stipulation and would accordingly give her the first option to
acquire the property (1) when she remarried, or (2) when the
youngest child reached majorityf or (3) when she desired to sell
the home. Nevertheless, in paragraph 12 of her Affidavit (R.60)
plaintiff asserts that she "advised the defendant of such
listings."

If the plaintiff had the first option to buy out the

defendant when she desired to sell the property, then to be
consistent, she should have notified the defendant that she was
selling the property and tendered him his money.
do this and doesn't assert that she did.

Plaintiff didn't

Instead of that, she

alleges that she "advised the defendant of such listings" as
though that somehow resulted in a waiver on his part.

If the

plaintiff had the first option, which was triggered when she
elected to sell the property, and she did Inot tender the money to
-5-

the defendant, then one can safely assume that at the very least
she waived her first option.

Even under plaintiff's version this

would give the defendant the next option to acquire the property.
Notwithstanding that, the plaintiff went to great lengths in
paragraphs 11 through 17 to show how defendant waived his first
option.

That would seem to be inconsistent with plaintiff's

version that she had the first option.

Of course defendant

disputes that he was ever given notice of the aforesaid listings
or of plaintiff's remarriage and, as stated in his Affidavit, he
at no time waived, nor intended to waive, his first option, which
the Decree of Divorce clearly gave him.

Commissioner Peuler found

in her first recommendation (R.51) that there was no evidence that
defendant "failed to exercise his option" and that recommendation
was not timely objected to by plaintiff as required by Rule 8 of
Third District Local Rules, copy of which is included in the
Addendum to appellant's initial Brief herein.

Even if plaintiff

had timely objected to the Commissioner's recommendation, the
issue of "waiver" of defendant's first option was never thereafter
tried, and no finding of fact made thereon one way or the other by
Judge Dee, nor indeed could there have been as no testimony was
ever permitted in this action.
At page 7 of plaintiff's Statement of Facts, it is
asserted that Mr. Hatch at no time offered to purchase Mrs.
Hatch's equity.

That is inaccurate.

Defendant was not aware of

the existence of the contingencies which permitted him to exercise
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his option until the Order to Show Cause was commenced oy tne
plaintiff*

In his Answer to that Order to Show Cause (R.52-53)

defendant clearly stated his willingness to acquire plaintiff's
equity in accordance with the provisions of the Decree of Divorce.
Further, it should be noted that even if the unexecuted
Stipulation were binding on the parties, the provision therein
which would have allowed plaintiff to exercise her "first option
to acquire the property" was triggered when she desired to "sell"
the home. Plaintiff seeks to acquire the home, not sell it.
At page 8 of the Statement of Facts, with reference to
private discussions between Commissioner Peuler and Mr.
Pignanelli, the plaintiff asserts that:
"A letter advising Mr. Hatch's counsel of these
discussions was sent to him in August of 1985. (See
Exhibit 'D' included in the Addendum to this Brief)."
That statement is entirely erroneous. Not only were the
conversations between defendant's counsel and Commissioner Peuler
irregular without counsel for defendant being present, but the
said Exhibit "D" is not dated until September 13, 1985, and was
received by counsel for the defendant some time thereafter.
Counsel for the defendant was not aware that Mr. Pignanelli had
entered the case until receipt of that letter sometime after
September 13, 1985.
At page 9 of the plaintiff's Statement of Facts
plaintiff asserts that the Order of October 9, 1985, was not
submitted to Mr. Pignanelli.

That is true, but the Order was
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served upon Mrs. Hatch in August 1985. (R.80)

Also, Notice

requiring plaintiff to Appear in Person or Obtain New Counsel was
served upon plaintiff in August before counsel for the defendant
knew that Mr. Pignanelli had appeared in the action for plaintiff.
(R.56)

As Mr. Wimmer did not know that plaintiff had retained Mr.

Pignanelli, it was proper for him to serve plaintiff herself.
Respondent's Brief asserts that the Order of October 9, 1985, was
not sent to Mr. Pignanelli by defendant's counsel, but said Brief
does not claim that Mrs. Hatch did not give Mr. Pignanelli her
copy of the proposed Order, and Mr. Pignanelli in fact received a
copy of the Commissioner's recommendation (R.51).
At the bottom of page 9 plaintiff asserts that:
"at the November 6, 1985, hearing, counsel for both
parties presented argument to the court and submitted
documents and Affidavits in support of their respective
positions."
That did not happen if plaintiff intends by that to imply that new
information was given to the Court.

It is true that counsel for

defendant furnished some documents from his file to the Court as
the Court did not even have the original file present, but there
were no documents submitted at that time which were not already in
the file. Furthermore, there was no argument on the merits of the
case, but only with regard to the preliminary matter of whether or
not the Court should give independent consideration to the case or
merely adopt the recommendations of Commissioner Peuler as a
matter of course.

Counsel were never permitted to argue the

merits of the case.
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It should be noted that there is no minute entry in the
file showing a hearing (or anything else for that matter) before
Judge Dee on November 6, 1985, nor is ther$ a memorandum decision,
nor any other indication that a hearing was held on November 6,
1985, except the reference thereto in the Order of March 19, 1986,
(R.93-95), which Order in its entirety is the subject of this
appeal, and with respect to which defendant asserts that there was
no hearing held on that date as the Court <^id not have the file,
did not have a clerk and did not have a reporter.

There should

have been a minute entry indicating that the matter (which was set
for hearing that day) was continued without date, but no such
minute entry has ever been prepared, and that apparently for the
reason that there was no clerk present to jnake such a notation.
Finally, at page 10 of plaintiff]1 s Statement of Facts,
plaintiff states that after the Court later indicated that he was
going to affirm Commissioner Peuler's ruling, her counsel prepared
and submitted proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an
Order.

It is correctly stated that defendant's counsel objected

to the proposed Findings and Conclusions, but plaintiff fails to
state that defendant also objected to the Order. (R.90-91)

In

those objections (R.90-91) defendant pointed out to the Court that
the Court had already ruled on this matter and noted that no
evidentiary hearing had been permitted and that therefore no
Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law or Order could be made.
Plaintiff also correctly states at page 10 of her Brief that:
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"Judge Dee ruled that a Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law were not necessary in connection with
the respective motions and that he would sign Mr.
Pignanelli's proposed Order which reflected his
affirmation of Commissioner Peuler's recommendation."
That is exactly what Judge Dee didf but he did not, and could not,
rule on disputed issues of fact as raised by the respective
Affidavits of the parties without taking evidence.

Indeed, Judge

Dee appears to have attempted to circumvent the need for an
evidentiary hearing by declaring in the Order of March 19, 1986,
what the "intent of the Decree of Divorce" was (R.94).

Since the

language of the Decree is clear, Judge Dee erred in rewriting that
language and, even if the language were deetmed to be ambiguous,
then Judge Dee erred in assuming that he is not required to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine "intent."
Plaintiff also correctly states in the concluding
paragraph of her Statement of Facts at page 10 of her Brief that:
"no transcript of any of the above hearings was made,
nor has appellant presented a statement of evidence or
proceedings . . . "
The reason for that is that there was no testimony taken, no
one was sworn, and no hearing took place on November 6, 1985.
Therefore, there is no transcript, and no statement of the
evidence or proceedings is possible because there is none.
ARGUMENT
Defendant will now respond to the argument of the
plaintiff, and will treat the subject matter of each of the
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plaintiff's points in the same order as contained in plaintiff/
respondent's brief.
POINT I.

APPELLANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE A

TRANSCRIPT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN REVERSAL OF THE LOWER COURT'S
DECISION.
Plaintiff asserts in her Point I that because appellant
did not provide a transcript, the trial court's decision must be
affirmed.

This assertion is clearly erroneous. Plaintiff asserts

that on November 6, 1985, the Court requested the parties to state
their respective positions, and that each Submitted copies of
motions filed and affidavits and supporting documents, and that no
objection to this procedure was made by the appellants, nor did
appellant request that the proceedings be reported.

The Court did

not request the parties to state their respective positions on the
merits of the case, nor for that matter on anything.

It is true

that each of the parties stated their position with respect to
whether a hearing should be had or whether the Court could simply
as a matter of course adopt the Commissioner's recommendation.
There was, however, no argument on the merits of the case.

It is

true that counsel's copies of certain documents already in the
file were handed to the judge because he did not even have the
file, but those were not submitted in connection with a hearing,
nor did the defendant understand that a hearing was being held.
It should be noted that counsel |for the respondent does
not dispute the fact that there was no clerk present, that there
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was no court reporter present, and that the file was not present,
and he does not deny that there is no minute entry and no
transcript.

We respectfully suggest that none of the normal

indicia of a hearing are present in this action.
Under those circumstances the Court could not and did
not conduct a hearing, and certainly no responsible judge would
have attemped to do so.

Indeed Rule 7(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, applies to such a situation and requires a continuance
in such a case. The rule states:
" . . . When on the day fixed for the hearing of a
motion or an order to show cause, the judge before whom
such motion or order is to be heard is unable to hear
the parties, the matter shall stand continued until the
further order of the court, or it may be transferred by
the court or judge to some other judge of the court for
such hearing."
Thus, when Judge Dee was not able to hear the motion, it was
continued automatically, even without being so ordered by the
Court and without minute entry.
One is compelled to ask, "How does one protect oneself
from a result such as this where counsel go» into chambers to talk
with the judge about preliminary matters, and the judge says he
will not proceed further that day, but will get the file and
review it?" Counsel for the respondent seemed to be saying that
counsel for appellant had a duty to get a reporter into judge's
chambers in order to record what the judge said.

But the fallacy

of this argument is that there is no obligation to request a court
reporter for a non-hearing.

It should be noted that even if
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defendant had requested a court reporter arid been denied by the
judge, there is no way to prove such in the absence of a court
reporter.

If Judge Dee considered what happened on that day as a

hearing, it would only be in the sense that he felt that he could
adopt the recommendation of Commissioner Peuler as a matter of
law, and as that matter was in a preliminary manner addressed by
counselr there might be some justification for saying that the
matter of adopting the Commissioner's recommendation without a
hearing on the merits was considered by the Court.

If that

position is takenf it is so clearly erroneous as to require very
little argument on our part.

It is clear that the judge must

conduct some kind of a meaningful, independent hearing and is not
permitted to adopt the recommendations of Commissioner Peuler in
every single case as a matter of course and without a hearing on
the merits.

Otherwise, the whole procedure is ridiculous.

Even

Judge Dee did not pretend that there was an evidentiary hearing
because when it was later called to his attention that there had
been no evidentiary hearingf he declined to sign Findings of Fact
or Conclusions of Law.

So he apparently felt that he could adopt

the Commissioner's recommendation as a matter of law.
Counsel did object to the Court's statement that it was
his practice to affirm the Commissioner.

The Court declined to

proceed further and said that he would review the filef presumably
to determine if an evidentiary hearing was necessary, and
reschedule the case for hearing.

In that event Judge Dee then no
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doubt concluded (erroneously we feel) that he could affirm the
Commissioner's recommendation without an evidentiary hearing as a
matter of law.
We respectfully submit that the Court could perhaps have
ruled as a matter of law that the Affidavit of the plaintiff did
not state a cause of action.

But we respectfully submit that

the Court could not make the opposite determination without an
evidentiary hearing as factual issues had to be resolved and
evidence taken by reason of the opposing Affidavits filed by
the parties.

It is true that defendant has not submitted a

transcript^ but there was no hearing held to be recorded.
There were no witnesses called; no one was sworn.
The cases cited by the plaintiff are totally
inapplicable to this situation.

It is grossly unfair for the

plaintiff to contend that defendant was charged with a duty of
providing the transcript of a non-existent hearing.
In Point I of her Brief plaintiff cites five Utah cases.
These cases simply stand for the proposition that where there has
been an evidentiary hearirg in the lower court (which was the fact
in each of those cases), that the Supreme Court is unable to, and
therefore will notf canvass the facts unless a transcript of the
evidence is furnished.

One of the cases there cited by the

plaintiff is Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P2d 607 (Utah, 1976)
(See page 14 of plaintiff's brief.)

Among other things from

the Sawyers decision plaintiff cites the following:
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"And, as under elementary principles of appellate review
we ' . . . presume the findings of the court to have
been supported by admissible competent, substantial
evidence . . . ', we affirm."
That is no doubt the correct principle in cases where
there has been evidence presented.

In the instant case, however,

there was, by plaintiff's own admission, no evidence presented;
there was, by plaintiff's own admission, no testimony; no
witnesses were called, and no one was sworh.
We respectfully submit that the reasoning of those cases
is wholly inapplicable to this case where there has been no
evidence presented and no findings made. This Court is not
required to "presume" that there is "substantial evidence" when
all parties admit that there was no evidence presented.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT ENTITLED TO EXERCISE
DISCRETION TO INTERPRET PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND
CERTAINLY HAS NO DISCRETION TO REWRITE THAT PARAGRAPH.
In plaintiff's Point II plaintiff seems to be saying
that the language of paragraph 5 is ambiguous, and therefore the
Court has discretion to interpret it, and even if it is not
ambiguous, it is unfair and therefore the court can modify the
Decree anyway in its discretion.

We respectfully submit that the

trial court cannot indulge "discretion" in matters of interpretation.

In interpreting the document the trial court is required

to interpret it in accordance with its clear intent if that intent
can be determined from the four corners of the document, and it
certainly can be determined in this instance.
-15-

The interpretation

of the document is an objective undertaking and is not a matter of
"discretion" which is subjective in its nature.
Further, it should be noted that it is not the intention
of the parties that is determinative in the matter of construction
of a judgment or decree.

The construction of a judgment calls for

determining the intent of the Court that entered it.

In 46 Am Jur

2d, Judgments, Section 73, it states:
"As a general rule, judgments are to be construed
like other written instruments. The determinative
factor is the intention of the court, as gathered not
from an isolated part thereof, but from all parts of the
judgment itself."
In the instant case the judge that entered the Decree
had before him a written Stipulation, which he approved, and when
he signed the Decree of Divorce he clearly intended to incorporate
that very Stipulation in the Decree in the form in which it was
filed in the action.

There is no way the Court could have known

any secret "intent" of the plaintiff, assuming that there was
such.

The Court intended the Decree to mean just what it says.

To allow the Court to rewrite the Decree, cis it has done,
constitutes an unlawful and improper collateral attack on the
Decree under the guise of "interpretation."

See 46 Am Jur 2d,

Judgments, Section 72.
Fairness of the Decree is not an issue here, but even if
it were, it certainly cannot be said that the Stipulation as
agreed to by the parties and adopted by the Court in the Findings,
Conclusions and Decree and allowed to stand for ten years is
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unfair.

The parties negotiated the settlement of this action.

Disposition of the house was only one aspect of the settlement and
was negotiated and approved by the parties. Plaintiff was
permitted to live in the home by paying a very modest mortgage
payment, and that arrangement could not be said to be unfair.
The trial court did not make a finding or ruling that
the Decree was unfair.

The trial court's decision was based upon

what it determined the "intent" of the Decree to be. Paragraph 1
of the Court's Order states:

"That the intent of the Decree of

Divorce entered in this court on November |21, 1975, as evidenced
by the stipulation, is that the defendant is to receive the onehalf share of his equity based upon the ampunt of equity existing
i

at the time of the Decree."

We respectfully submit that it is

entirely impossible for the Court to determine that such was the
intention of the Court from the four corners of the document. The
document most clearly states the opposite.
Furthermore, the Affidavits of the respective parties
were contradictory, and no evidence was taken by the Court from
which it could have determined what the "intent" of the parties
was aside from the clear language of the document even if such
intent were relevant.

Certainly the decision of the lower court

cannot be supported on the basis of unfairtness to the plaintiff.
The Court can only modify a decree of divorce upon a material and
permanent change of circumstances, and thqre has been no
allegation or proof of any such change.
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As stated in Land v. Land, 605 P2d 1248, at page 1251:
"Equity is not available to reinstate rights and
privileges voluntarily contracted away because one has
come to regret the bargain made. Accordingly, the law
limits the continuing jurisdiction of the court where
property settlement agreement has been incorporated into
the decree, and the outright abrogation of the
provisions of such agreement is only to be resorted to
with great reluctance and for compelling reasons."
If this Court considers this matter one which might fall
within the definition of "compelling reasons," then at the very
least those compelling reasons should be explored in an
evidentiary hearing.

So far as known to appellant, this Court has

not stated what would constitute "compelling reasons."

However it

would seem to require at the very least a canvassing of all of the
facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the Decree
as well as any permanent, material change of circumstances during
the ten years since the entry of the Decree.
We do not think that DeBry v. DeBry, 27 Ut 2d 337, 496
P2d 92 (1972), assists plaintiff.

In that case the defendant

(wife) signed a Stipulation without the assistance of counsel, and
a Decree of Divorce was entered based upon the Stipulation.

Some

five weeks later (and while the Decree was still interlocutory,
but presumably after the time for appeal had expired) the wife
moved to vacate the Decree, set aside her default, and be
permitted her to file her Answer and Counterclaim.

After a

hearing was held on the Motion to Vacate, the trial judge denied
her requested relief.

On appeal the Supreme Court seemed to feel

that the Stipulation might have been improvidently entered into by
-18-

her (without counsel) and that the lower court should conduct a
full hearing on the matterf and accordingly the Supreme Court
vacated the Decree of Divorce and sent the case back for a full
plenary hearing on all financial aspects of the case. That case
therefore involved in effect a Rule 60(b) Motion to Vacate the
Decree which the Supreme Court felt should have been granted, and
accordingly reversed and remanded the matter for full hearing.
In this case plaintiff has never made a motion to
vacate the Decree, and accordingly the Decree must stand and be
interpreted according to the four corners jthereof, which can be
done witout resort to extraneous matters. Furthermore, the action
of the plaintiff in DeBry was taken within five weeks after the
entry of the Decree, whereas in the instant case the plaintiff has
permitted over ten years to elapse and certainly is guilty of
laches.

In this action plaintiff had counsel, whereas the wife

had no attorney in DeBry.

At the very least the DeBry case stands

for the proposition that substantial modifying of a decree should
not be undertaken without a full evidentiary hearing.

That has

never been afforded to defendant in the instant action.
POINT III(A).

THE FAILURE TO SUBMIT A COPY OF THE

PROPOSED ORDER OF OCTOBER 9, 1985, TO MR. PIGNANELLI DOES NOT
PRECLUDE THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA.
Point III(A) of the respondent's Brief appears to
state that defendant was required to serve a copy of the proposed
Order which was signed by Judge Dee on October 9, 1985, on Mr.
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Pignanelli.

It is true that Rule 2.9(b), Third District Local

Rules, requires that copies of a proposed order be served upon
opposing counsel before being presented to the court for
signature.

However, we respectfully submit that that rule only

applies to attorneys who have made an appearance in the action and
therefore are known to opposing counsel.

In the instant case the

hearing before Commissioner Peuler was conducted with Nolan J.
Olsen appearing for the plaintiff.

Mr. Olsen withdrew from the

action on July 19, 1985, (R.50) and Commissioner Peuler's
recommendation was made on August 23, 1985, (R.51).

Thereafter

Mr. Wimmer, counsel for defendant, served ci Notice to Appoint
Counsel or Represent Self (R.56) upon plaintiff, and also sent a
copy of the proposed Order to the plaintiff herself (R.80).

Both

of those documents were served in August prior to defendant's
counsel, Leland K. Wimmer, receiving the letter and notice from
Mr. Pignanelli announcing his appearance in the action sometime
subsequent to September 13, 1985. Accordingly, the proposed Order
was properly served on plaintiff herself and was not required to
be served upon Mr. Pignanelli.
Although plaintiff claims that the Order of October 9,
1985, is not final because a copy thereof was not served upon Mr.
Pignanelli, it should be noted that Mr. Pignanelli has not
disputed that he received a copy of Commissioner Peuler's
recommendation dated M8-23-85" (R.76) and which indicates that it
was sent to counsel on "8-26-85" and contains Mr. Pignanelli's
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name.

Defendant's attorney, Leland K. Wimmer, is blind and didn't

read Mr. Pignanelli's name thereon, nor did his secretary read it
to him, and Mr. Pignanelli's name thereon was not noticed until cocounsel discovered it there in connection with work on this
appeal.
Rule 8 of the Third District Court Rules states that a
party has only five days in which to object to a recommendation,
and states in subparagraph (d) of said Rule 8:
"If no objection or request for further hearing is
made within five (5) days, the party shall be deemed to
have consented to entry of an order in conformance with
the Commissioner's recommendation."
Therefore, even if the Court should feel that a copy of
the Order should have been served upon Mr. Pignanelli, inasmuch as
Mr. Pignanelli did not timely object to the recommendation, the
plaintiff is "deemed to have consented to entry of an order" and
therefore defendant is entitled to the Order of October 9, 1985,
as a matter of law.

Even if the proposed Order signed October 9,

1985, should have been served on Mr. Pignanelli, the Utah cases
cited by plaintiff only stand at most for the proposition that
such an Order is not final for purposes of appeal.

If defendant

is entitled to the entry of the Order under Rule 8, then such a
judgment must logically be a bar to the Order of March 19, 1986.
If the judgment of October 9, 1985, is not deemed final, that
merely means that plaintiff can still appeal it, but it still
stands as a bar to the later Order unless the plaintiff does
appeal and this Court reverses.

-21-

Calfo v, D. C. Stewart Co,,

717 P2d 697 (Utah, 1986),

involved a situation where a summary judgment was entered, but
Rule 2.9(b) was not complied with.

Thereafter the trial court

entered another order stating that:
"the summary judgment entered by the court on January
14, 1982 ... was properly signed and entered by the
court on said date and is in full force and effect..."
The Supreme Court thus in effect held that the second order
constituted a filing of the first order, thereby recogizing the
first order as a valid order except that the appeal time ran from
the entry of the second order.
It would therefore seem that the order of October 9,
1985, (even if Rule 2.9(b) had not been complied with) was valid
for all purposes except to start the appeal time running, and
certainly bars the Order of March 19, 1986.
It therefore appears to be inescapable that the judgment
of October 9, 1985, has been duly entered, or at the very least
defendant is entitled to have it entered under said Rule 8(d). We
respectfully submit that such valid, existing judgment (or entitlement to judgment) cannot simply be ignored.

Our Rules of Civil

Procedure provide that a judgment can be amended or vacated in
accordance with Rule 52(b), Rule 59 or Rule 60. None of those
rules have been called upon by plaintiff to vacate or amend the
Order of October 9, 1985, and it does not appear that any of the
provisions of said rules are applicable to this case. The
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judgment of October 9, 1985f has thus not been amended or vacated
in accordance with Rule 52(b), Rule 59 or Rule 60, nor has the
judgment of March 19, 1986, been entered pursuant to application
of said rules, and the said March 19 judgment is therefore void.
In Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P2d
798 (1964), this Court held that a second judgment, not having
been entered in compliance with Rule 52(b) or Rule 59(b), was
void.

We believe the same rule to be applicable in the instant

case.
POINT I I K B ) .

DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PLEAD RES

JUDICATA AS A DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION TO COMPEL.
Plaintiff asserts that defendant was required to raise
in writing the defense of res judicata to Ithe Verified Motion to
Compel Defendant to Execute Quit-claim Deed and Requesting Clarification of Decree. We respectfully submit that that is not the
law.

Rule 8(c), URCP, requires res judicata to be raised as an

affirmative defense in an answer to a complaint or counterclaim or
reply to counterclaim, but does not require it to be raised in
writing in response to a motion.

A motion is not a pleading

within the meaning of Rule 7(a), URCP.

The Rules of Civil

Procedure nowhere require the Rule 8(c) affirmative defenses to be
raised in writing responding to motions, nor do they require a
written answer or reply to a motion at al^.. The matter would have
been raised at the hearing before Judge D^e on November 6, 1985,
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if there had been a hearing.
date.

However no hearing was held on that

The response of the defendant to the said Verified Motion

was by Affidavit of the defendant (R. 70, 71) and of his attorney
(R.72, 73), both of which were served on September 27, 1985, and
accordingly before the entry of the aforesaid Order of October 9,
and therefore the fact of the entry thereof could not be included
in said Affidavits.

The fact of the entry of the said Order of

October 9, 1985, as a bar to further proceedings was raised before
Judge Dee prior to entry of his judgment of March 19, 1986, in
paragraph 2 of the Objections served and filed by the defendant on
March 3, 1986. (R.90-91).
on March 19, 1986.

Said Objections were heard by the Court

(See paragraph 10 of defendant's Brief.)

The

issue therefore was clearly raised in the lower court.
POINT IV.

THE PLAINTIFF HAS REQUESTED IN EFFECT A

MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.
In her Point IV plaintiff denies that she is asking for
modification of the Decree of Divorce.

If the plaintiff is not

requesting modification of the Decree of Divorce, then as
hereinabove noted, the Court can only interpret the Decree of
Divorce from the four corners thereof when the intention is clear
from the document itself, which indisputably it is in the instant
case; therefore, if counsel is not asking for modification of the
Decree, there is no way that the courts at this time can consider
the question of "intent" or "fairness" of the Decree of Divorce
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or any other matter beyond the four corners of the document.

We

therefore submit that if the plaintiff is not asking for modification of the Decree, the courts are limited to interpreting the
meaning of the Decree of Divorce from the four corners thereof,
which clearly precludes the relief sought by the plaintiff in her
Motion to Compel.
If, on the other hand, the plaintiff is seeking
modification of the Decree, then we believe that she must likewise fail for the reasons set forth in Land v. Land, supra.
POINT V.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO NO ATTORNEYS FEES OR

COSTS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL.
We believe that the decision of the lower court was
erroneous, that defendant has been entitled to resist the same
below and in this Court, and that accordingly no award of
attorney's fees or costs to the plaintiff is justified.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we believe that the Order of
March 19, 1986, should be reversed and that the language of the
Decree of Divorce be thus adjudged to be clear and unequivocal,
and accordingly that defendant has the first option to acquire the
property as set out in the Decree of Divorce, and that defendant
has not waived that option.
If this Court shall not grant the foregoing relief, then
the Order of March 19, 1986, should be vacated and the defendant
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granted, at the very least, a full evidentiary hearing in the
District Court.

LELAND K.
GORDON A.
ROBERT C.
Attorneys
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